Introduction
Nature conservation effects not only to the state of biodiversity but is also a huge issue for local development (Adams and Hutton 2007) . Because of contradictions between 'parks and people' it has become important to examine what are the potential solutions to integrate conservation and development objectives . In this literature review we examine two kinds of governance instruments, which aim to transform topdown conservation practices towards more participatory and social just governance: co-management arrangements and Payments for Ecosystem Service (PES) schemes. Co-management means the sharing of power, knowledge, resources and responsibilities between the government, local resource users and other stakeholders (Carlsson and Berkes 2005; Berkes 2009 ). PES can be defined as a system for the additional provision of environmental services through conditional payments to voluntary providers (Tacconi 2012) . Interestingly, both approaches have also evoked debate whether to target environmental objectives detached from social objectives or should the instruments aim to achieve integrated environmental and social goals simultaneously (Wilshusen et al. 2002; Muradian et al. 2013) . Furthermore, for both governance instruments, the reasons for failures to meet integrated conservation and development targets have been connected with failures regarding bottom-up participation (Corbera et al. 2007; Berkes 2009 ). In this paper participation is not approached via examining what properties of decision making processes enhance fair and balanced participation, as done in mainstream literature on participatory processes (e.g. Cornwall 2008; Reed 2008) . Instead, we approach participation from more bottom-up perspective and see that the problem of heterogeneous positions, views and relationships of local people needs to be taken into account in the analysis of participation, especially if the goal is to design instruments that fit to the social conditions they intend to govern. If successful, enhancing DOI 10.1515 DOI 10. /cass-2015 received August 18, 2014; accepted September 23, 2015 Abstract: We draw on the concept of 'fit' to understand how co-management and Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) as governance instruments could better acknowledge local social complexities. Achieving 'participatory fit' requires well-designed and fair processes, which enhance local acceptance towards the implemented rules. Thus, such fit can contribute to establishing new institutions in conservation governance. However, previous literature on participation has had strong focus on properties of decision-making processes, which often neglects the question on how local realities effect on local people's ability and willingness to participate in the work of governance instruments. We approach 'participatory fit' by identifying six properties of heterogeneous local social systems that governance instruments need to acknowledge to nurture balanced bottom-up participation: 1) economic resources and structures, 2) relationships to land, 3) level of education, 4) relationships between diverse actors, 5) divergent problem definitions, and 6) local identities. We discuss related sources of misfits and develop proposals on how conservation instruments could function as bridging organizations facilitating polycentric institutional structures that fit better to the social systems they are intended to govern. Such hybridization of governance could avoid pitfalls of considering one particular instrument (e.g. co-management or PES) as a panacea able to create win-win solutions.
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One of the key reasons for why the efforts to integrate conservation and development have tended to fail is that the social-ecological systems and institutions do not 'fit' to each other (Brown 2003; Folke et al. 2007 ). Young and Underdal (1997) define the fit issue as follows: "The problem of fit asserts that the effectiveness and the robustness of social institutions are functions of the fit between the institutions themselves and the biophysical and social domains in which they operate" (cited from Folke et al. 2007: 2) . Institutions are understood as rules of the game and social norms (North 1990) , while the co-management arrangements and PES schemes are seen as governance instruments, which may contribute to building institutions contributing to conservation and social objectives. In order to achieve institutional acceptance or "social fit", "participatory fit", balanced participatory processes acknowledging local social conditions, needs to be promoted. Thus, "participatory fit" does not guarantee that the co-management arrangements or PES schemes are able to create enduring socially acceptable institutions, but certainly promotes such possibility (DeCaro & Stokes 2013) . Furthermore, local conditions (e.g. heterogeneous social and economic positions; world views; social capital), and institutional aspects (e.g. informal rights to use resources), influence on the implementation of co-management and PES instruments. We examine the challenges these governance instruments encounter relating to bottom-up participation when aiming to develop fair institutions for conservation governance.
The literature using explicitly the concept of fit has focused on ecosystem properties and their relationships to institutions , not so much on the institutions' fit with the local social conditions (Brown 2003) . Outside the "fit" literature examinations have been done on the relationships between governance, institutions and social systems developing framework for better understanding such linkages within the context of social-ecological systems and proposing design principles for institution building (Ostrom 1990 (Ostrom , 2009 Cox et al. 2010 ). This paper differs from such systemsbased and institution-led approach by exploring how local motivation and ability to participate in the work of governance instruments is impacted by the interplay between governance instruments and heterogeneities at the local level. When local motivation for participation is enhanced, it is more likely that the local people accept the rules of the game as proposed by the governance instruments. Furthermore, the novelty is to link such focus on co-management and PES especially regarding bottom-up view on participation and using explicitly the concept of participatory fit.
The objective of this paper is to examine what are the properties of local social systems which conservation instruments should acknowledge in order to facilitate the ability and willingness of local people to participate in the co-management arrangements and PES schemes, and how resulting participatory fit can be enhanced. We do not compare the two instruments as such for example relating to how well they meet social needs, but seek to explore similarities and differences in what features of local social systems the instruments need to take account to facilitate balanced bottom-up participation.
Participation was chosen to represent a key avenue towards social fit (institutional acceptance) because: 1) Top-down conservation has been criticised because of its negative impacts on local people, and participation has been considered a key means of linking local people with conservation instruments. Thus, participation seems to be essential for enhancing the fit between conservation and local social objectives (see Wilshusen et al. 2002; ; 2) It is often argued that the lack of participation leads to poor development outcomes, local incompliance with the implemented rules, and sometimes also to poor environmental outcomes. In other words, the lack of fit of conservation instruments with their local social contexts leads to institutional failure (Hiedanpää 2013) ; and 3) Conservation institutions often aim to promote participation for normative, instrumental and/ or substantive reasons and, thus, the lack of participation diminishes the legitimation and knowledge base of the institutions and, further, their fit with their social contexts. In worst case, instrumental participation undermines wide local diversity. Thus, conservation arrangements need to support rather empowerment and relationship building than technical environmental management using participation only to justify certain kind of management.
Lack of acknowledging local social heterogeneities can lead to misfits between conservation governance and local people undermining local ability and willingness to participate to the co-management arrangements or PES schemes. As suggested by the literature, polycentric institutional structures can help in achieving better fit leading to institutional acceptance (Figure 1. ).
We will start by outlining insights on the problem of fit and on polycentric institutions as a solution to improving the fit between governance instruments and social-ecological systems (Section 2). Then we will present material and methods regarding the literature review on co-management and PES (Section 3). In sections 4 and 5 we will examine what properties of local social systems co-management arrangements and PES schemes should take into account to facilitate participation and to enhance fit. In Section 6, we will generalize some potential patterns of misfits that may lead to pathologies in conservation governance and discuss how these misfits can be overcome by polycentric and adaptive institutions.
The problem of fit and polycentric institutions 2.1 The problem of fit
Following the approach taken by fit theorists (e.g., institutions are devised by people and facilitate or constrain certain kinds of actions that shape human interaction (North 1990 ) and institutions relate to natural systems by coordinating human behaviour and its impacts on natural systems (Hanna et al. 1997) . Institutions include formal constraints and incentives, such as rules and laws, but also informal constraints including norms of behaviour, conventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct. We see that if successful the co-management arrangements and PES schemes can develop acceptable institutions that contribute to both conservation and social objectives.
A key characteristic of the idea of fit is to examine ecosystem properties that institutions should acknowledge in order to enhance ecological consequences of governance. Examples of such ecosystem properties include complexity, dynamic and evolving variability and cross-scalarity (Young 2002; Folke et al. 2007 ). Modern ecosystem management often focuses on narrowly defined goals to be accomplished with the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) approach and on managing a single resource, such as timber or fish stocks, instead of holistic ecosystem management. The focus on single resources by MSY approach has led to several misfits and pathologies: more vulnerable ecosystems, more rigid and narrowly scoped management institutions and increased dependency (Holling and Meffe 1996; Berkes and Folke 1998; Folke et al. 2007) . Pathology refers to a situation where resource governance leads constantly to situations characterized by unsustainable use of the resources and / or conflicts between various parties linked to the resources and their use.
Previous and scarce literature on social fit has acknowledged that the size of the community, family structures, and land ownership are all factors that need to be taken into account. Also, the composition of the community will create heterogeneity: there may be hierarchies, the genders may have different roles, ethnic groups may have divergent positions, and there may be informal rules determining the use of the 'commons' (Brown 2003) . According to some authors simplistic assumptions about the homogeneity of local communities as often employed by the conservation instruments are likely to lead to poor outcomes in terms of participation and distributional justice (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Brown 2003) . In such cases the problem can be conceptualized as a misfit between conservation instruments and local social systems leading to a failure to engage and involve the local people, leading to pathology as a result of local non-compliance regarding the implemented rules (Dzingirai 2003; Jack et al. 2008; Naidu 2009; Hiedanpää 2013) . Balanced bottom-up participation can nurture institutional acceptance by local actors (DeCaro & Stokes 2013).
Polycentric institutions to overcome the problem of fit
Polycentric governance regimes can be seen as complex, adaptive systems without a single, central authority dominating all of the other actors and policy arenas (Andersson and Ostrom 2008) . Basically this means that institutions from various levels are nested and will collaborate with each other to make better informed and fairer decisions. What is suggested is that participatory local-level governance arrangements should be nested within larger political systems to create a well-functioning governance regime (Andersson and Ostrom 2008; Ostrom 2010) . This is important, as efforts to decentralize governance, for example by introducing participatory elements in state-based planning and governance, do not sufficiently take into account other governance levels but aim to operate at a single level (Nagendra and Ostrom 2012) . Furthermore, polycentric governance can improve the fit between knowledge, action and social-ecological contexts, and encourage innovation and experimentation by encouraging individuals and organisations to explore a variety of ideas for coping with complex problems (Olsson et al. 2007 ). Thus, the polycentric institutional arrangements enhance potential for achieving participatory fit because such arrangements can better take account of heterogeneous stakeholder groups. This may lead to local institutional acceptance, social fit.
Material and methods

Rationale for the approach
As power sharing is the key objective of co-management, its success can be measured by its ability to enhance local participation into the negotiations facilitated by the co-management arrangements. On the other hand, the objective of PES schemes is to balance benefits and burdens resulting from conservation and such balancing can be viewed as successful if it includes diverse groups of people and creates local motivations for participation into the PES schemes. Thus, common issue for co-management arrangements and PES schemes is that their success to enhance sustainability is dependent on the scope of participation. These governance instruments can be compared by examining what properties of social systems these instruments need to take account to enhance local participation.
Both co-management and PES instruments are topical, relevant and can be looked at simultaneously because they share particular relationships to governance-community interface aiming to enhance social sustainability of conservation. However, there are also differences between the two instruments, which makes comparison in terms of local participation interesting. Firstly, participation of representative local diversity may be more important for co-management, while PES schemes may be successful even if engaging only large land owners. Secondly, co-management is by default focusing on social justice, while PES aim to safeguard ecosystem services. However, often also PES schemes aim to balance benefits and burdens of conservation by developing incentive structures directing the use of environment and its services, but these incentives may not be specifically directed to the poor. Thirdly, it is interesting that we found that categories in explaining local willingness and ability to participate in co-management and PES were rather similar (table 1) .
Comparing two different kinds of governance instruments can lead to more general results than if working with single type of instrument. As such our work contributes not only to understanding fit between co-management and PES and local social systems, but also more broadly to understanding other kinds of governance instruments, such as adaptive governance, polycentric governance, different forms of collaborative natural resource management, indigenous and traditional peoples conservation management, and maybe even to other topical market-based governance instruments, such as Individual Transferable Quotas, and various kinds of compensation mechanisms..
Methods
We have reviewed the literature on co-management (105 papers) and PES (63 papers) trying to find answers to the question: What properties of the local social system explain the ability and willingness of locals to participate in these governance instruments? We stopped the literature screening when the papers seemed not anymore provide novel insights compared to earlier results. That the number of reviewed papers relating to co-management is higher than to PES can be explained by two things. Firstly, co-management instruments are have been around longer than PES schemes and thus there are more publications relating to co-management. Secondly, our research question focused on the local participation, which is more often considered in co-management literature than in PES literature.
We reviewed only few pieces from grey literature focusing mainly on peer-reviewed publications. We did not have specific geographical focus, but focused on the papers that contributed to our research question. However, majority of co-management papers concerned developing countries, especially Africa and Asia, while PES literature focused mainly on Latin America. To frame our literature review we used the following key words in our literature searches: participation, local stakeholders, co-management, shared forest management, communitybased forest management, PES, conservation, benefits and burdens of conservation, social impacts of conservation, and local use of resources. The co-management literature consisted mainly of general works on the subject as well as various types of jointly managed forest and protected area cases, which examined local participation. Also the reviewed PES literature focused on those papers dealing explicitly participation from local point of view, and also exploring what kind of preconditions PES schemes require from local service sellers. In addition, the common theme in both reviewed literatures was that they addressed situations where both environmental and social objectives were trying to be achieved. Thus, this focus excluded many papers focusing on environmental outcomes of PES.
It should be noted that we focused more on the issues that require elaboration than positive aspects, and thus we realise that there may be a bias in our review towards "negative aspects" of co-management and PES. This position is justified because we want to identify and stress issues that need potential improvement to enhance fit between the governance instruments and local social conditions.
For analysis of the insights from literature review qualitative conventional content analysis was used. It is an analytical tool suitable to situations where existing theory is limited, like in the case of participatory and social fit. Conventional content analysis builds generalizable categories inductively from the material to build theory (e.g., Hsieh and Shannon 2005) . We first identified statements from the literature explaining the locals' ability and willingness to participate regarding co-management and PES. These statements were clustered to identify explanatory themes about properties of local social systems that the conservation instruments need to acknowledge to nurture participatory fit. Finally, the identified themes were compared between co-management and PES, and general categories suitable for both sets of literature were formed (Table 1) . These general categories form subsections in Sections 4 and 5 on co-management and PES. Furthermore, the themes and general categories also point to sources of potential misfits between conservation institutions and local social systems, which are further discussed in section 6 including plausible solutions to the identified sources of misfits. 
Fit between local social systems and co-management arrangements
Co-management is developed and increasingly common in state-managed protected areas as well as in indigenous and community conservation areas (Castro and Nielsen 2001; Dearden et al. 2005; Bertzky et al. 2012) . The promise of co-management lies in partnerships and collaboration which is characterized by working with multiple interests, social learning, trust building, adaptability and transparency in decision making (Carlsson and Berkes 2005; Berkes 2007; Armitage et al. 2009 ). One of the government's main objectives in co-management is biodiversity conservation and its legitimation in the eyes of the local people (Stoll-Kleemann et al. 2010) .
Local support for conservation initiatives is commonly assumed to be essential for long-term conservation success (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Thakadu 2005) .
On the other hand, local people also want to conserve their environment with the help of the government and its greater resources, but in return they need to accept restrictions to their use of resources and to obey the negotiated rules. The co-management process can be costly (Reid et al. 2004 ), but it is assumed to be possible to create a win-win situation for the government, the environment and the local people. What are the properties of local social systems that institutional solutions must take into account to foster participation?
Local economic structure
Co-managing and conserving a forest requires resources and investments from local people, mainly in the form of labour time. Investments in fencing, monitoring, technology and the hiring of guards are also common. Ability to invest in such issues may be hindered by small group size or large size of the co-management area increasing monitoring costs (Agrawal and Goyal 2001; Chhatre and Agrawal 2008) . Wealthy households in a community may ensure enough economic power to invest, bargaining power to negotiate with the officials, as well as the ability to maintain collective activities during economic shocks (Naidu 2009 ). However, richer households may lack interest in participating (due to the high opportunity cost of time) (Baland and Platteau 2007) . Similarly, really poor households often prefer to use their time in labour providing necessary household income, since they benefit less from participation which usually bears fruit only in the long run (Adhikari and Lovett 2006a; Maskey et al. 2006) . Thus, external support from the government, NGOs and aid agencies may be essential for the implementation of co-management arrangements (e.g., monitoring, technical assistance, conflict resolution and equal participation), although the local people should not become too dependent on it (Menzies 2007; Croncleton et al. 2012 ).
Diverse local relationships to the land and the environment
Local people are often more interested in development than conservation (Kellert et al. 2000; Brockington 2004 (Brown 2003; Lachapelle et al. 2004; Adhikari and Lovett 2006b) . Women, the poor and less educated people are more dependent on the forest for their subsistence needs and have fewer possibilities to work outside the community (Adhikari et al. 2004; Agarwal 2010; Mukul et al. 2012) . Likewise, some low-caste professions such as blacksmiths, firewood sellers and alcohol distillers depend on firewood and on an easy access to the forest (Soussan 2000; Lachapelle et al. 2004) . Hence, it is essential to have all diverse groups represented in co-management meetings in order to ensure that their specific concerns, needs and, thus, greater local information are taken into account in decision making.
Tenure security and clear use rights have been shown to be important for successful forest co-management (Pagdee et al. 2006; Behera 2009 ). Furthermore, if local people do not have long-term (formal) assurance of their right to continue extracting resources from a forest or the delegation of the rights does not match with the responsibilities, they may have no motivation to either participate or conserve the forest for the future (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001; Croncleton et al. 2012 ). On the other hand, the property rights to the land are commonly held de jure by the state even if the community has de facto rights 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51 to these lands. In some traditional mobile communities resource boundaries are often changing and adaptable, which is another challenge to defining clear rights (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004 ). Thus, co-management arrangements should seek to understand, recognise and respect existing local land-use rights in order to design better fitting institutions.
In order to work well, co-management arrangements need to be accompanied by well-defined boundaries of the users and the resource system (Pagdee et al. 2006; Singh et al. 2011) . Thus, the scale of the co-managed area should somehow correspond with the size of community and the heterogeneities within it (Dzingirai 2003) . At least two problems may arise related to this. Firstly, those working in areas adjacent to the co-managed area may be excluded from the co-management arrangements but still have various impacts on the co-managed area. Secondly, the problem of including all relevant groups, stakeholders and individuals within the co-management arrangement is more likely to arise when the co-managed area is large in scale. Sometimes local people, especially women, cannot participate regularly due to long distances (unless their expenses are covered) and family responsibilities (Nightingale 2002; Borrini-Feyarabend et al. 2004) . Participants living closer to the co-managed forest are often more willing to participate, since they have better access and lower transaction costs (Ray and Bhattacharya 2011; Musyoki et al. 2013) . These findings link also to design principles for management of common pool resources (Ostrom 1990; Cox et al. 2010 ).
Local education and knowledge
Formal education is often related to positive conservation attitudes and participation (Xu et al. 2006; Baral and Heinen 2007) . Educated people are needed for reading and writing official documents, negotiation, overcoming possible language barriers and taking part in research tasks to facilitate implementation of co-management arrangements (Cronkleton 2012) . Even signing the co-management agreement may be an arduous process if the local people, often partly illiterate and unaware of the full contents of the pre-formed agreement imposed on them, cannot trust the officials (Castro and Nielsen 2001) . Thus, co-management institutions should take into account the local level of education to better enhance participation, and also to enhance the fit between the bureaucratic requirements of the co-management arrangement and the local capacity to cope with them.
Local relationships
Co-management requires cooperation among the local people and between the locals, government officials and NGOs. Social capital -trust, networking, reciprocity -facilitates cooperation and is linked to enhanced participation and conservation outcomes in co-management arrangements (Pretty 2003; Ray and Bhattacharya 2011; Jones et al. 2012) . In some cases, however, particularly strong social bonds may lead to the exclusion of participants who do not belong to the main group as well as to mistrust towards outsiders (e.g., Portes 1998). Consequently, mistrust between local people, the government and other stakeholders, which is often rooted deep in history and linked to past management practices, may easily become an obstacle to co-management and local people's participation (Coombess and Hill 2005) . In the case of misfit between existing relationships and relationships required for well-functioning participation and a successful co-management arrangement, trust building can be highly beneficial. Therefore, what is important, is not only 'bonding' but also 'bridging' social capital, which refers to the relationships between groups (Pretty 2003) . Bridging social capital is essential in the case of social heterogeneities (e.g., caste, religion, kinship) within a community and when dealing with the state, NGOs or neighboring villages (Carlsson and Berkes 2005; Berkes 2007 ).
Diverging problem definitions
The co-management and conservation of forests are typically driven by the western ideas of science and management culture. However, indigenous and other local people who have a very different world view are often forced to integrate themselves into the western policy and management framework (Reid et al. 2004; Adams 2008) . Western conservation science may also conflict with the local people's explanation for a problem and its solutions, if the problem is even admitted (Pretty 2003; Sillitoe et al. 2010) . On the contrary, if the local people understand that their forest is declining, yet not extremely scarce, it can create common interest towards protecting the resource on which they are dependent (Agrawal 2001; Araral 2009 ). Thus, in order to achieve enhanced participation and collaboration, co-management practices should be sensitive towards local conceptualizations of nature and related problems. 
Local identity
Diverse local identity markers involving variation regarding residence time, wealth, gender, caste, ethnicity, community identity and sense of belonging are shown to affect local people's ability and willingness to participate in co-management efforts (Jumbe and Angelsen 2007; Naidu 2009; Mulrennan et al. 2012) . It often happens that the co-management actually reifies existing power relationships and the most powerful group starts to dominate in decision making while excluding the others (Maskey et al. 2006; Naidu 2009 ). For example, authority in local forest management committees is often held by the local elite, caste, family, ethnic group or political party and, above all, men (Kellert et al. 2001; Lund and Treue 2008) . These groups are usually wealthier and more educated than women, poor, low-caste and illiterate people, and they tend to participate in co-management meetings more often (Agrawal and Gupta 2005; Baral and Heinen 2007) . Wealthy and powerful participants may also control the use of the resource and the distribution of the benefits for their own needs (Kumar 2002; Malla et al. 2003; Jones 2007) . Moreover, even when women or disadvantaged people do participate, they may not dare to speak out their disagreements or their concerns may be easily dismissed (Malla et al. 2003; Agarwal 2010) . However, the presence of women in co-management is linked to better conservation outcomes and wider participation in general (Lise 2000; Agarwal 2009 ). Also, ethnicity and migration matter when thinking about participation in co-management. For example, people who have lived in an area for many generations can still be considered as outsiders and excluded from co-management arrangements. As a result, the 'outsiders' may start or continue to disobey the rules, e.g., continue or even expand livestock grazing and killing the wildlife inside a conservation area (Dzingirai 2003) .
Fit between local social systems and payments for ecosystem services
In order to stress the connection between the environment and human well-being the concept of ecosystem services is increasingly used to better recognize the services provided to people by nature (MA 2003) . Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) is an emerging institutional arrangement for enhancing ecosystem service production by internalizing the ecosystem services to the market in order to change the behaviour of natural resource users via the provision of economic incentives (Corbera and Brown, 2008; Jack et al. 2008; Sommerville et al. 2009; Corbera 2012; Wunder 2013) . PES schemes are widely considered as a voluntary tool with a well-defined service "bought" by at least one "buyer" from at least one "provider" (see Wunder 2007; Asquith et al. 2008) . 'In theory, PES should over time become a self-sustained market in which ecosystem service consumers channel financial resources to service providers' (Corbera et al. 2009: 745) . The PES are paid by service users, governmental organisations or NGOs to service providers. Land users, who often have little incentive to promote conservation in the lands they use, can be encouraged to do so through PES schemes that aim to cover the opportunity costs of more nature-friendly land use and management (Pagiola et al. 2002; Engel et al. 2008) .
When thinking about local people from the viewpoint of fairness and equity, in the context of PES or otherwise, it is essential to ask who counts as a subject of justice and whose equity is in question (Fraser 2009; McDermott et al. 2013) . PES schemes often involve participation deficiencies and are severely centralized in terms of implementation decisions (Corbera et al. 2007; Adhikari and Agrawal 2013) . It has also been argued that PES projects involving local people show more chances of being sustained over time (Reynolds 2011) . Furthermore, the promise of PES may be shadowed by the fact that the "market solutions are mechanisms for defining and defending particular distributions of social power, and should be understood and contested as such" (O'Neill 2001: 710) . On the other hand, there is on-going discussion whether to design PES so that they would also take account social aspects and poverty alleviation via detailed focus on local participation to achieve win-win solutions, which however, remain often at ideal level (Muradian et al. 2013 ). According to another argument PES should be designed to achieve only environmental outcomes and considering social benefits only as side-effects (Pagiola et al. 2005; Wunder 2013 ). We see that PES schemes cannot forget local participation as PES do simply not work if they fail to motivate voluntary service sellers from local level. Next we explore which properties of a local social system PES should take into account in order to facilitate fair local participation. Corbera et al. (2007) point out that those who lack other economic opportunities are more likely to participate in PES projects. However, it would be rather simplistic to assume that the poor would be more likely to take part in PES because of the additional source of income (Huang et al. 2009 ). It has been found out that in some projects participation has been limited to wealthier land owners (Neef and Thomas 2009) . In some PES schemes the participants may be required to make short-term investments on the service provided (e.g., reforestation), which are expected to have long-term benefits. The poor may not be able to invest or allocate land for protection because they need it for subsistence. Other reasons hindering the participation of the poor in PES include the lack of clear property rights, the lack of land, the high transaction costs and the fact that, with leased land, tenants cannot make long-term commitments without agreement from the land owner (Grieg-Gran et al. 2005) . Furthermore, service buyers may prefer contracts with large land owners in order to limit transactions costs, which would be high when making multiple small PES contracts (van Noordwijk et al. 2012 ).
Local economic structure
Diverse local relationships to the land and the environment
PES schemes may also conflict with cultural practices regarding the use of the land, and there are often local informal ways to gain subsistence that may be in conflict with PES. Furthermore, PES may reify existing inequities in decision making especially if it also fails to take into account the informal nature uses (Corbera et al. 2007 ). If local people realize that the resource management strategies promoted by the PES scheme conflict with local practices increasing food security, they may retreat from these schemes (Corbera 2012) . On the other hand, villages and households involved in collective forest management and benefiting from an adjacent protected area are often more likely to accept conservation measures from which they can receive payments (Fisher 2012) .
For service providers, the motivation to take part in a PES scheme is determined by the opportunity costs, which are affected by two issues. Firstly, if the locals have the rights to lands which provide a high level of services, the payments are higher and, subsequently, the PES scheme is more likely to reduce poverty (Jack et al. 2008) . Secondly, there is often trade-off between the old way to use the land and participation in PES scheme, and if the revenue from the old land use is higher than the amount paid for ensuring the flow of ecosystem services, there is no financial incentive to take part in the PES scheme (Pagiola et al. 2005; Corbera et al. 2007) . Thus, PES schemes should calculate opportunity costs and design the PES accordingly (Wunder 2007) . Furthermore, low quality farmland can more easily be subjected to service provisioning than highly productive farmland, as then the loss due to restricted use is not very high (Jack et al. 2008 ). Thus, in order to facilitate local participation in PES, the payments should also take into account the heterogeneity of livelihoods and the diverging incomes they produce in order to provide such payments that are perceived as fair by the local people (Wunder 2007) .
PES approaches encourage assigning property rights to and pricing services provided by nature. These services can in turn be traded within the market to encourage the sustainable management of nature (Liverman 2004; Pejchar et al. 2007; Bruner et al. 2008; Daily and Matson 2008) . In addition, PES may easily prioritize those locals with clearly defined property rights, and the participation of those who rely, for example, on common lands and informal property rights may easily be excluded (van Noordwijk et al. 2012; Lemaitre 2011) . Also, historical conflicts regarding the internal distribution of property rights may explain the villagers' unwillingness to cooperate and lead to an acceleration of conflicts between those families that had earlier become engaged in PES and those left out of the PES project (Corbera 2005) .
Transaction costs are essential to consider in the implementation of a PES scheme. Transaction costs for PES include establishing an organisation for implementing and running the PES programme, enforcing the property rights essential for implementing PES in order to accurately define who holds the rights on those lands and the ecosystem characteristics providing the services, and the continuous operating costs due to the monitoring and renegotiating of the payment contracts (Farley and Costanza 2010; Pagiola et al. 2002) . Jack et al. (2008: 9467) have argued that "when resources are owned by many small-holders, transaction costs will possibly be higher, implying a trade-off between cost-effectiveness and poverty alleviation". Thus, complex land-ownership relations might hinder participation in PES. Furthermore, requirement for payment receivers to pay transaction costs themselves can decrease local willingness and ability to participate into the PES schemes (Pagiola et al. 2005) . Thus, local land rights are essential to consider when implementing PES schemes, and this implies that PES scheme managers need to decide whether to facilitate wide local participation with some extra costs or to focus on keeping the costs from transaction at minimum by engaging only large land owners.
Institutions must match the scale of the ecosystem services they govern (Farley and Costanza 2010) . The spatial scale from which the services are provided and also 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51 the movement of the service (e.g., water) poses challenges for the identification of the relevant participants in the PES scheme. As Corbera et al. (2007) have highlighted, it would be essential to carefully map the potential participants (including, e.g., upstream service providers) in the project in an early phase of the implementation to avoid friction between the various service providers, especially between those engaged and those excluded. Corbera et al. (2007) have also found out that communities living around a protected area and involved in clandestine loggings were left out of the negotiation process over a PES scheme. Thus, whether certain locals are considered as potential participants in a PES scheme can depend on their location of residence or activities in relation to the area providing the services, e.g., a protected area or river.
Local education
Individual heterogeneity regarding education affects the ability and motivation to participate in PES (Jack et al. 2008) . The lack of education may hinder participation in interactions with officials and more 'educated' people. It may also be that potential service providers need information about the value of their land from an ecosystem service perspective (Ajayi et al. 2012) . For example, it has been found out that education programmes regarding effects of upstream deforestation for downstream water supply has increased understanding of the dynamics of ecosystem services and created enhanced knowledge base for supporting PES (Asquith et al. 2008) . Such issues complicate the implementation of PES and highlight that different degrees of knowledge about the ecosystem services may create distinctions at the local level. Thus, local access to technical support impacts on the level of local participation in PES (Corbera et al. 2007 ).
Local relationships
Social capital between local people and PES scheme officials effects on successes in poverty alleviation. Without strong internal organisation and external linkages local communities cannot affect the rules to be implemented by a PES scheme or effectively defend and secure their rights to the environment. In fact, lack of relationships and trust building mechanisms targeting relationships between service providers and byers has been identified as a key explaining factor hindering diffusion of the PES schemes (Asquith et al. 2008) . Communities require internal social organisation in order to successfully negotiate with PES schemes and to handle and balance the internal distribution of the benefits and burdens that arise from PES (Rosa et al. 2004) . Diverging local relationships towards the organisations implementing PES, such as governmental organisations, conservation officials or NGOs, may also explain participation or the lack thereof. Ajayi et al. (2012) found out that locals with a history of interaction with the NGO responsible for the PES scheme were slightly more likely to receive PES contracts than the others.
Divergent problem definitions
The meanings attributed by locals to the kind of behaviour that is incentivized by PES or the kind of behaviour that should be constrained in order to participate in PES can foster or discourage participation in PES schemes (Kerr et al. 2012) . Regarding PES schemes in Mexico, McAfee and Shapiro (2010: 594) state that "conflicts over PES in Mexico suggest that ES commodification and other conservation policies framed by market logic are likely to clash with state agendas and with equity goals in the global South, particularly where rural social movements are mobilized in opposition to neoliberal policies". Here the locals did not consider PES to promote equal and fair distribution of benefits and burdens or to facilitate their participation, but rather PES scheme was seen as an approach serving elite interests and threatening local practices. Thus, PES was seen rather as a problem than a solution. Similarly Robertson and Wunder (2005) found out that some PES projects in Bolivia met with opposition both from those who saw them as limiting future economic development and from those who viewed PES as privatization of nature. Muradian et al. (2013) note that introducing market logic to environmental governance may endanger some previously existing institutions based on social norms towards conservation or limited use of ecosystem services.
Local identity
Men and women often have different roles regarding their interactions with the environment (Caizhen 2010) . Corbera et al. (2007) state that a PES project promoting the planting of native timber-oriented species benefitted the interests of men, while women would have preferred planting fast-growing tree species on common land that could have been used for poles or fuelwood. Furthermore, even though women in this case were active in the management of the forest commons by collecting 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50 fuelwood and practicing herding, they were not engaged in the PES project meetings. This was because the PES project managers had interacted only with the local authorities, who have tended to marginalize women from forest commons-related decision making (Corbera 2005) . Thus, PES schemes may reinforce existing power relationships (see Chen et al. 2009 ) and lead to cultural discontinuity, for example, in the use of the commons, as land-use practices incentivized by a PES scheme are favoured against traditional subsistence use. Finally also economic or otherwise organized pressure groups may have rather large impact on the design of PES leading to biased outcomes in terms of distributional justice (Boyce 2002; Corbera et al. 2009 ).
Discussion
Misfits and pathologies in conservation institutions
In Table 2 we summarize our results regarding potential misfits between conservation institutions and the properties of local social systems. We also see that the misfits may lead to pathologies undermining the success of conservation institutions in producing positive environmental and social outcomes.
How to overcome the misfits: the potential of polycentric institutions
A bridging organisation is one which connects various governance levels. It provides a forum for trust building, learning, vertical and horizontal collaboration and conflict resolution, and can bring in resources and knowledge (Folke et al. 2005; Berkes 2009 ). Bridging organisations can function as forums for co-management between NGOs, the state and the locals (Olsson et al. 2007) , and can also link the locals to the markets. Links can also be established between conservation institutions and international development and aid organisations, such as the World Bank, NGOs and the United Nations' bodies. Polycentric institutional structures are often seen as self-evolving without central authority. Yet, it is possible to discuss possibilities on how co-management arrangements and PES schemes may be designed as bridging organizations to enhance links between various decision nodes in conservation governance in order to enhance participatory and social fit. Such polycentric governance arrangements may enhance local selforganization and thus turn potentially hierarchical and patronizing governance towards building local ownership and coordination regarding environmental governance. Next we discuss how the identified potential misfits can be eased by bridging organizations and polycentric institutional structures.
Easing misfit regarding heterogeneous economic positions and local identities
Regarding the problem of heterogeneous local identities and economic positions we see that polycentric institutional structures could help. In case of co-management it might be useful to design such a polycentric institutional structure that each local group would be represented in the co-management arrangements. On the other hand, the poor, sometimes marginalized women, and those lacking formal property rights could be represented by a local leader or forum with whom the PES contract could be negotiated in order to reduce their transaction costs (Pagiola et al. 2002; Kemkes et al. 2010) .
Prior to implementing a locally sensitive polycentric institutional structure (Figure 2 ), the local groups should be mapped carefully. Stakeholder analysis (e.g., Reed et al. 2009 ) might be helpful in mapping the various local groups by focusing on the following questions: 1) What are the divergent local groups related to the co-managed area or who are the service providers? 2) What are the relationships between these groups? 3) Is there an existing structure or leader for these groups with whom the negotiations could take place? 4) Who are the winners and losers resulting from implementing the plans of the conservation instruments? 5) Who are the stakeholders of the adjacent areas impacting on the service provision of the managed area? Grounding the development of polycentric institutional structure to such stakeholder analysis could help to reduce misfits resulting from neglect of local social and economic heterogeneity.
Maybe the most important function of the locally diverse institutional structure would be to enhance balanced and representative participation. This is important because fully involving local people into decision and rulemaking in an early phase of planning as well as maintaining frequent face-to-face communication could help in overcoming the problems related to trust, potential elite capture, mutual understanding and rule compliance as well as conflict resolution (Agrawal and Goyal 2001; Andrade and Rhodes 2012; Baral 2012) . Potential elite capture links to different properties of social systems in the examined cases. In PES land owners with   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51 Table 2 . Sources of misfit and the resulting pathologies regarding relationships between conservation instruments and local social systems.
Source of misfit
Potential 'pathology' Manifestation in co-management Manifestation in PES Conservation institutions do not sufficiently acknowledge local economic structures and resources.
The poor lack resources to make short-term investments to gain long term benefits created by governance instruments. Groups left outside will be motivated towards non-compliance towards the introduced rules.
Co-managing requires resources and investments from local people, mainly in the form of labour time and investments in fencing, monitoring, technology and the hiring of guards. The poor have not possibility to such investments as gaining everyday subsistence is more important. Supporting references: Chhatre and Agrawal 2008; Agrawal and Goyal 2001; Adhikari and Lovett 2006a; Maskey et al. 2006 Only large land owners are taken into account in PES due to transaction costs; the poor potential service providers may not be able to limit use of ecosystem services required to receive payments due to need for everyday subsistence.
Supporting references: Corbera et al. 2007; Huang et al. 2009; Neef and Thomas 2009; van Noordwijk et al. 2012 . Previous local relationships to the land and the environment are not acknowledged by conservation instruments.
Unacknowledged informal land-use rights lead to further marginalization of those without clear property rights. Land uses in adjacent areas producing 'spill over' effects fall outside the scope of conservation instruments.
Diminishing informal local rights are not acknowledged or compensated. Locals may be pressured towards heavier use of the co-managed area due to land use in adjacent areas, but this remains often unacknowledged in compensations or when implementing restrictions.
Supporting references: Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004; Lachapelle et al. 2004; Musyoki et al. 2013 .
PES that do not acknowledge existing informal land rights may reify existing inequalities and undermine local participation. PES need to be conscious about heterogeneous opportunity costs to facilitate local participation. 'Upstream' service providers may not be included if focusing on a certain (protected) area. Supporting references: Pagiola et al. 2005; Corbera et al. 2007; Wunder 2007; Jack et al. 2008; Corbera 2012 Local capacities in terms of knowledge and education are not sufficiently taken into account by conservation instruments.
Locals have an 'educational' and knowledge barrier to participating.
Bureaucratic requirements for participating to co-management arrangements hinder local engagement. Locals may have bureaucratic barriers to participating and may not understand the value of their land (or the commons) in terms of ecosystem service production and do not see the connection to PES instruments. Supporting references: Jack et al. 2008; Ajayi et al. 2012 . Local relationships to each other or to outside actors are not addressed by the conservation instruments.
Distrust among locals hinders self-organization and distrust between locals and management officials undermines local participation.
Lack of trust and mutual understanding between conservation institutions and locals hinder participation. Supporting references: Carlsson and Berkes 2005; Coombess and Hill 2005; Jones et al. 2012 .
Poor local relationships towards PES officials hinder participation.
Supporting references: Rosa et al. 2004; Asquith et al. 2008; Ajayi et al. 2012 .
Local conceptualizations of the underlying problems and their solutions are not understood or addressed by conservation instruments.
Problem definitions are not shared and locals may perceive the governance instruments as part of the problem instead as potential solution leading to distrust.
Problem definitions and management are driven by western science which, however, may often be out of line with local understandings of environmental problems or their solutions.
Supporting references : Pretty 2003; Adams 2008 Sillitoe et al. 2010 PES may easily be seen as part of neoliberal political agendas, and as such often opposed in principle because of ideological reasons. Introducing market-based instruments may lead to decline of local social norms directing the use of environment. Supporting references: Robertson & Wunder 2005; McAfee & Shapiro 2010; Kerr et al. 2012; Muradian et al. 2013 . Conservation instruments do not sufficiently acknowledge local identities Power imbalances at local level are reinforced or even introduced by implementing new governance instruments.
Only some groups are included into co-management (e.g., men, indigenous groups), or co-management is dominated by local elites. Supporting references: Maskey et al. 2006; Lund and Treue 2008; Naidu 2009; Agrawal 2010. The men and local leaders are more taken into account in PES schemes, and local interest groups may effect on the distribution of benefits from PES. Supporting references : Boyce 2002; Corbera 2005; Chen et al. 2009; Corbera et al. 2009. formal property rights are in a better position whereas in co-management arrangements those high in social hierarchy have better possibilities to participate.
Easing misfit between conservation instruments and diverse local relations to land and environment
Leadership and translation could help in easing misfits arising from neglect of diverse local relationships to land and environment. The leaders could facilitate the distribution of compensations and payments so that each user of the commons would understand and/or gain certain benefits resulting from the restrictions to the use of the commons. For example, PES may contribute to common benefits by funding the development of infrastructure and facilitate the creation of social networks for sharing best practices in resource management (Bozmoski and Hultman 2010; Corbera and Brown 2010; Corbera 2012) . PES could also establish cooperative strategies between formal and informal resource managers in order to create more inclusive and fair projects (Corbera et al. 2007 ). In the case of co-management, the leaders and representative groups could arrange local mechanisms for the monitoring and sanctioning of the rules, which is critical for successful co-management (Gibson et al. 2005; Pagdee et al. 2006; Chattre and Agrawal 2008) . These issues can help in overcoming misfit regarding a contradiction between requirements for investments of time and resources insisted by co-management and PES and scare local resources. The above issues can justify and promote short term investments for long term benefits, and by those means make local participation more tempting.
Easing misfit regarding lack of education
In respect to misfit arising from lack of education among local people improving access to government officials and educational opportunities is especially important for the poor who lack these possibilities (Agrawal and Gupta 2005) . Bridging organisations could arrange capacity building for the leaders through whom the interactions between the officials and the poor could take place, and the leaders could then distribute the knowledge to the people whom they represent. This could be a cost-effective way to cope with the misfit between the bureaucratic requirements of co-management and PES and the degree of local education. Such capacity building could take place in two areas. Firstly, translation efforts should also be directed towards explicating the long-term benefits of the conservation actions. Furthermore, the bridging 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51 organisations could collect some funds from service buyers, state organisations and NGOs and channel these funds via the leaders or local decision nodes to various people to help them to cope with the increased responsibilities, implemented restrictions and requirements for short-term investments. This can be expected to be more relevant for co-management arrangements where long term benefits are directed to common lands and are not so straight forward. On the other hand, regarding PES locals can receive concrete payments immediately resulting from conservation actions, and thus there is not so large need for explaining the received benefits. Secondly, for people to participate in PES, they require knowledge on what ecosystem services they can sell. Thus, translating the ecosystem service framework into practical terms for the locals would be advisable.
Easing misfit regarding poor relationships
Regarding misfit resulting from poor relationships between locals and other actors it could be advisable to utilize already existing structures that people use and which they are accustomed to (e.g., Corbera et al. 2007 ). For example, local groups which are divergent, e.g., in relation to ethnicity or livelihoods are likely to have leaders who can be consulted. On the other hand, it has been noted that if the presence of marginal groups (e.g., women) in the meetings of the conservation institution is not possible, one should consider separate women's or youth committees or otherwise ensure that women and other disadvantaged people are heard (Thakadu 2005; Mohanty and Sahu 2012) . The leaders of these groups can then take the responsibility for forming representative negotiation forums for their groups. Furthermore, utilizing existing leadership can also help in building networks and connecting actors horizontally across the local level as well as vertically from the local level to a bridging institution or in some cases even directly to government officials, NGOs and private actors (Olsson et al. 2007 ). This helps to overcome the misfits resulting from poor relationships by building bridging social capital between different actor groups and by utilising existing bonding social capital within single groups. Trust building and maintaining close relationships are time-demanding but rewarding tasks and are often focused around key persons and leaders who are committed to their work (Olsson et al. 2004; Folke et al. 2005; Gutiérrez et al. 2011) . Internal bonding social capital seems to be more relevant for co-management where it helps to ensure balance regarding benefits and burdens resulting from co-management. In PES schemes internal social capital is not as important especially if the PES contracts are negotiated individually between different local service providers, but bridging social capital becomes emphasized. Finally, relationship building could take place even between the local leaders and national and international actors, and bridging organisations could arrange a two-way mechanism for the flow of knowledge. This two-way mechanism could be part of the overall adaptive governance strategy of the conservation institutions (see Folke et al. 2005 ).
Easing misfit between problem definitions
Relationship building not only eases the misfit resulting from lack of connections, but can also help in creating shared problem definitions. Firstly, bridging organisations could promote the leaders' learning about the conservation instruments' views on the problems and their solutions, and the leaders could then make an effort to translate these ideas to the people they represent. This increases understanding of various parallel views on what are the problems and preferred solutions, and thus reduces potential for the misfit regarding divergent problem definitions. Here we highlight the importance of sensitivity and monitoring regarding not only the ecological consequences of the implementing the governance instruments but also the local social dynamics and variation. For example, sensitivity regarding PES schemes is needed regarding local ideologies and their relationship with neoliberal agendas, as PES might be deemed as extension of private governance difficult especially in areas with strong left wing ideologies. In addition, both co-management arrangements and PES require sensitivity towards local perceptions of environmental problems and their solutions, which are often defined by western science in conservation governance. Utilizing a more holistic, longer-term social research approach with respect to existing traditional management practices, ethics, values and cosmology (Houde 2007; Peterson et al. 2010) , and transdisciplinary research sensitive towards the needs and views of local people as well as decision makers (Sarkki et al. 2013 ) can work as a basis for socially sensitive adaptive governance. This can lead to better accounts of the social dynamics of conservation instruments, and when this is combined with the inclusion of a truly adaptive and flexible governance system in PES or co-management, improvements can be made to enhance the fit between conservation institutions and local social dynamics. Figure 3 summarizes the challenges, pathways and benefits regarding the fit between conservation institutions and the properties of local social systems.
Conclusion
This paper has started to fill the gap in examining the fit between institutions and the properties of local social systems. We approached the issue of participatory and social fit from the perspective of participation. However, unlike mainstream literature on participation focusing on properties of decision making processes, to structure our literature review we asked how participation is linked to the problems of locality. As a result we identified six key properties of local social systems that the conservation instruments need to acknowledge to facilitate local ability and willingness to participate in co-management arrangements and PES schemes. This bottom-up view on participation can be also used in further research to elaborate theory on participatory and social fit. Based on the literature review on co-management and PES we found out that the challenges for fit were quite similar despite the outlined differences between the two types of institutions. This brings validity to the potential sources of misfit between conservation instruments and local social systems. Thus it can be expected that these sources of misfit may be relevant also for other kinds of instruments and provide starting point for further theory building on participatory and social fit. Properly acknowledging and easing the identified misfits can help conservation governance to build enduring institutions that have better potential to meet environmental and social goals simultaneously.
Despite the divergences between co-management and PES it could be beneficial to combine them to ease weaknesses of both approaches. This suggestion is grounded by findings that many integrated conservation and development projects have failed because providing insufficient economic incentives for locals to change their behaviour (Gibson and Marks 1995) and mere economic incentives are unlikely to work without the proper communication and trust building between the locals and those providing the economic incentives (Wunder 2006) . This combination could alleviate the problems in co-management related to the lack of financial incentives to complying with new rules. On the other hand, the co-management approach could help PES schemes to develop trust and mutual understanding and capacity to comprehend the ecosystem service paradigm. Such hybridization of use of governance instruments could avoid pitfalls of considering one particular instrument (e.g. co-management or PES) as a panacea able to create win-win solutions (Muradian et al. 2013) . Hybrid and polycentric governance could thus lead to more context specific governance solutions enhancing potentially both social and environmental outcomes.
We have proposed some ways to enhance participatory and social fit especially linked to polycentric institutional 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51 structures and co-management arrangements and PES schemes as bridging organizations. These proposals can be used in the planning and development of environmental governance institutions. Yet, it should be recognized that even though the governance instruments aim to manage environment they depend crucially on people and thus conservation instruments need to include anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists working on conservation projects involving local people and cultures. Future research is especially needed on the social and participatory aspects of fit in order to better understand what kind of process design is required to enhance balanced participation and to avoid potential misfits and resulting pathologies in conservation governance. More research is needed on the ways how different governance instruments succeed in motivating local participation, which can finally lead to new institutions in conservation governance. Our results stress that promoting bottom-up participation is by means no simple task, but requires sensitivity towards local heterogeneities. Such sensitivity can enhance social fit, which advances environmental governance in practice by creating more legitimate and contextually informed solutions to the problems of conservation and development . 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51 
